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“AUDIT THE FED” FROM AN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE: 
FINANCIAL REFORM THROUGH AN UNHOLY COALITION OF 
UNWITTING MISESIANS 
INTRODUCTION 
I asked [Richard] Posner why the Fed’s errors constitute a failure of 
capitalism. He said the central bank was part of the “capitalist structure,” along 
with property rights and a judicial system to enforce them. To the extent that 
the Fed mismanaged the money supply (or interest rates) and failed to assure 
“a reasonable degree of economic stability,” it has to be regarded as a failure 
of capitalism.1 
It tends to carry credence when Judge Richard Posner, one of the most 
cited legal scholars in American history,2 chalks up the 2008 financial crisis to 
“a failure of capitalism.”3 And, as demonstrated by the above quotation, Judge 
Posner seems to gloss over any particular role played by the Federal Reserve 
(the Fed) by labeling the central bank as merely part of a “capitalist structure.” 
In contrast to Posner’s metatheoretical approach in analyzing America’s 
economic woes, this Comment takes a more modest approach by focusing on 
the Fed not as a part of a system of capitalism, socialism, or some other 
economic system, but as simply a creature of legislation.4 Indeed, the Federal 
Reserve Act establishes a congressionally chartered central bank5 with a 
presidentially appointed board of governors6 and a dual mandate of maximum 
 
 1. Caroline Baum, Capitalism Still Has Legs That Are Long and Sexy, BLOOMBERG (April 
30, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHEie5ri2clo&refer= 
home. 
 2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000). 
 3. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION (2009); See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST 
DEMOCRACY (2010). 
 4. For a comprehensive account on the political nature of the origins of the Federal 
Reserve, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WORLD WAR II 183–259 (2002). “The financial elites of this 
country, notably the Morgan, Rockefeller, and Kuhn, Loeb interests, were responsible for putting 
through the Federal Reserve System, as a governmentally created and sanctioned cartel device to 
enable the nation’s banks to inflate the money supply in a coordinated fashion, without suffering 
quick retribution from depositors or noteholders demanding cash.” Id. at 258. 
 5. Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2006). 
 6. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . 
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate . . . .”). 
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employment and price stabilization.7 Accordingly, as a modest first step 
towards effective financial reform, this Comment proposes amending the 
Federal Reserve Act to provide for a full audit. Doing so would provide 
accountability to both policymakers and the public at large, putting a “political 
check” on the Fed operations that bring about and prolong economic crises. 
Part I provides some brief background information on the current “audit 
the Fed” movement and introduces the Federal Reserve Transparency Act 
legislation currently being considered in the House of Representatives. Part II 
looks at recent efforts by Bloomberg, L.P., through Freedom of Information 
Act litigation and Congress through a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act to partially enhance Fed transparency. 
While limited in scope, the information gathered from these transparency 
measures sheds light on the type of information one might expect, at least 
partially, from a full audit. Part III considers some theoretical models for 
understanding the roles the Fed plays in both bringing about and managing 
economic crises. The most important of these theoretical models is Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory, which explains how the central bank, through credit 
expansion, creates “boom and bust” cycles in the economy. This section 
further examines other economic concepts that are relevant to understanding 
why certain political movements are well suited to join a coalition to demand a 
Fed audit. Part IV shows how Austrian Business Cycle Theory explains the 
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. Part V looks at two 
prominent American political movements—Occupy Wall Street and the Tea 
Party. Both of these movements have platforms that would be conducive not 
only to demanding a Fed audit, but also providing a political check on Fed 
credit expansion. By pursuing economic and ideological interests that are 
unrelated to Austrian Business Cycle Theory, these two groups can form what 
may seem to be at first blush an unlikely alliance that keeps Fed-induced 
business cycles in check. In appealing to both the Occupy and Tea Party 
movements, an audit of the Fed might prove to be an easier fix than addressing 
what Judge Posner diagnosed as the failure of an entire economic system. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
House Bill 459, the Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, with a 
purpose “[t]o require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of 
 
 7. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term 
interest rates.”). 
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the United States,”8 passed the House of Representatives on July 25, 2012.9 
The bill, which had at least 274 co-sponsors and passed 327 to 98 with 
bipartisan support, was described as “a coup for its chief sponsor, Rep. Ron 
Paul (R-Tex.), a longtime nemesis of the Fed.”10 Indeed, Ron Paul had been 
introducing “audit the Fed” bills in Congress for a decade.11 
Although House Bill 459 eventually died after passing the House, 
Representative Paul’s influence spreading the “audit the Fed” message 
continued into his 2012 presidential campaign. During the campaign, 
Republican nominee Mitt Romney showed some support for an audit of the 
Federal Reserve.12 Accordingly, “[u]nder pressure from anti-tax Tea Party 
activists and other small government advocates,”13 the Republican Party 
included a plank in its platform calling for an annual Fed audit: 
[T]he Republican Party will work to advance substantive legislation that brings 
transparency and accountability to the Federal Reserve, the Federal Open 
Market Committee, and the Fed’s dealings with foreign central banks. The first 
step to increasing transparency and accountability is through an annual audit of 
the Federal Reserve’s activities. Such an audit would need to be carefully 
implemented so that the Federal Reserve remains insulated from political 
pressures and so its decisions are based on sound economic principles and 
sound money rather than on political pressures for easy money and loose 
credit.14 
Notwithstanding this plank in the Republican platform, Mitt Romney devoted 
little time to this issue in his losing presidential bid. 
However, if the wind has been knocked from the sails of the “audit the 
Fed” movement, it may only be temporarily. According to Rasmussen, roughly 
 
 8. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 459, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Audit the Fed’ bill passes in the House with bipartisan support, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (July 25, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/ 
post/audit-the-fed-bill-set-for-house-vote/2012/07/24/gJQAJypU7W_blog.html. For Ron Paul’s 
arguments against the Fed, see RON PAUL, END THE FED (2009). 
 11. Chris Moody, Ron Paul’s ‘Audit the Fed’ bill passes the House, ABC NEWS (July 25, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/ron-pauls-audit-fed-bill-passes-house/story?id=168 
55319#.UO0IwW-CniU. 
 12. Lisa Lerer & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Romney Calls for Fed Audit as Party Mulls 
Platform Plank, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
08-20/romney-calls-for-fed-audit-as-party-mulls-platform-plank.html. (“‘The Federal Reserve 
should be accountable,’ Romney told thousands of voters at a campaign rally today in Goffstown, 
New Hampshire. ‘We should see what they’re doing.’”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2012 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, 
2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 4 (2012). 
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seventy-five percent of Americans favor auditing the Federal Reserve.15 
Accordingly, at the beginning of the 2013 legislative session, Representative 
Paul Broun (R-GA), with a stated plan “to pick up right where Congressman 
Paul left off,” filed “audit the Fed” legislation identical to that of the retired Dr. 
Paul.16 House Bill 24, the proposed Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 
2013, would “require a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of 
the United States.”17 More importantly, the audit would occur within twelve 
months “[n]otwithstanding section 714 of title 31, United States Code, or any 
other provision of law.”18 Indeed, House Bill 24 would go so as far as to repeal 
the following exceptions on audits of the Federal Reserve under current law:19 
(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign 
country, or nonprivate international financing organization; 
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, including 
discount window operations, reserves of member banks, securities credit, 
interest on deposits, and open market operations; 
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market 
Committee; or 
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between members of the 
Board and officers and employees of the Federal Reserve System related to 
clauses (1)-(3) of this subsection.20 
Most notably, a Fed audit under House Bill 24 would be more thorough than 
any audit under current law, including monetary policy decisions, agreements 
with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open Market 
Committee transactions.21 If the results of recent efforts to partially enhance 
Fed transparency, described in Part II, are any indication of the type of 
information one can expect to learn from a full audit, one can expect full 
ammunition for those seeking public accountability and a political check on 
Fed operations. 
II.  CURRENT FED TRANSPARENCY 
To advocate for a full audit of the Federal Reserve is not to say that current 
law provides for no Fed transparency. Under 31 U.S.C. § 714, the Comptroller 
 
 15. 75% Favor Auditing The Fed, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 29, 2009), http://www.rasmus 
senreports.com/public_content/business/general_business/july_2009/75_favor_auditing_the_fed/. 
 16. Ginger Gibson, Broun wants to audit the Fed, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-congress/2013/01/broun-wants-to-audit-the-fed-153390.html. 
 17. Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 24, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 31 U.S.C. § 714 (2006). 
 21. H.R. 24. 
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General may audit several monetary and finance agencies, including the 
Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve banks.22 However, 31 U.S.C. § 
714(b) specifically excludes the following from these audits: 
(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a foreign 
country, or nonprivate international financing organization; 
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, including 
discount window operations, reserves of member banks, securities credit, 
interest on deposits, and open market operations; 
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market 
Committee; or 
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between members of the 
Board and officers and employees of the Federal Reserve System related to 
clauses (1)-(3) of this subsection.23 
These exclusions mean that Fed audits under current law are not very thorough 
and, most importantly, do not include monetary policy decisions, agreements 
with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open Market 
Committee transactions. Important information, however, regarding Fed action 
during the economic crisis has been obtained in other ways: most notably, 
through litigation by Bloomberg, L.P., and an “audit the Fed” provision in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The 
Bloomberg litigation will be discussed next, followed by the Dodd-Frank 
provision. 
A. Bloomberg FOIA Litigation 
In 2008, media corporation Bloomberg, L.P. submitted Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(the Board) seeking details about loans made to private banks at the Discount 
Window and pursuant to emergency lending programs in April and May 
2008.24 Bloomberg asked for the name of the borrowing bank, the amount of 
the loan, the origination and maturity dates, and the collateral given for each 
loan.25 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
rejected the Board’s claims that this information was exempt from FOIA 
disclosure and that a request to the Board did not constitute a request for 
information held by the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks.26 The Board, 
joined by a group of banks, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
 
 22. 31 U.S.C. § 714. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 145 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 25. Id. at 145–46. 
 26. Id. at 146. 
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the Second Circuit, arguing for exemption under Exemption Four of the FOIA, 
which allows a federal agency to refuse disclosure of “trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”27 
In order to qualify under Exemption Four: “(1) The information for which 
exemption is sought must be a trade secret or commercial or financial in 
character; (2) it must be obtained from a person; and (3) it must be privileged 
or confidential.”28 Noting the narrow compass of FOIA exemptions and the 
preference for disclosure, the court held that the information at issue—the 
identity of the borrowing bank, the dollar amount of the loans, the loan 
origination and maturity dates, and the collateral securing the loan—was not 
“obtained from” the borrowing banks within the meaning of the exemption.29 
The court noted that while “[a] completed loan application will ordinarily 
contain considerable information, and when it is submitted to a lender, the 
lender has ‘obtained’ that information from the applicant,” “[t]he information 
requested by Bloomberg was generated within a Federal Reserve Bank upon its 
decision to grant a loan.”30 This information did not come into existence until a 
Federal Reserve Bank made the decision to approve the loan request.31 
Furthermore, even if the court were to consider the information as 
“obtained from” the Federal Reserve Banks themselves, as “persons,” the 
information still was not “privileged or confidential” within the meaning of 
Exemption Four.32 Information is only “confidential” for the purposes of 
Exemption Four when disclosure would cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.33 
The court rejected the Fed’s argument that the exemption applied to the Fed’s 
program “to furnish critical infusions to distressed banks on a confidential 
basis.”34 Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment in favor of Bloomberg.35 
 
 27. Id. at 146–47; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 28. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 147 (citing Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 148. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 149–50. 
 33. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 150. 
 34. Id. “The Fed . . . argued that revealing borrower details would create a stigma — 
investors and counterparties would shun firms that used the central bank as lender of last resort — 
and that needy institutions would be reluctant to borrow in the next crisis.” Bob Ivry, Bradley 
Keoun, & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov 27, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-
loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html. 
 35. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 151. 
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As a result of the FOIA action, Bloomberg obtained 29,000 pages of Fed 
documents detailing 21,000 transactions.36 The Fed committed $7.77 trillion as 
of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, including $13 billion in secret 
Fed loans undisclosed to Congress, providing what Bloomberg called “[a] 
fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009.”37 According to 
Bloomberg, “[D]etails suggest[ed] taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the 
secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest 
banks to grow even bigger.”38 The data showed that the six biggest U.S. 
banks—JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, 
and Morgan Stanley—borrowed as much as $460 billion from the Fed and 
accounted for sixty-three percent of the average daily debt to the Fed by all 
publicly traded “U.S. banks, money managers and investment-services 
firms.”39 
B. Dodd-Frank Audit 
In June 2010, members of a House-Senate conference committee reached a 
compromise to allow expanded audits of the Federal Reserve40 under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.41 Language 
from the Senate version of the bill granted the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) authority to audit the Fed’s emergency lending programs and 
release details about the firms that benefited from those programs.42 The 
compromise broadened these audits to include the discount window and its 
purchases and sales of government securities, requiring the Fed to disclose 
details about such transactions within two years after they occur.43 Ultimately, 
section 1109 of the Dodd-Frank Act included the following GAO audit of the 
Federal Reserve: 
Notwithstanding section 714(b) of title 31, United States Code, or any other 
provision of law, the Comptroller General of the United States . . . shall 
conduct a one-time audit of all loans and other financial assistance provided 
during the period beginning on December 1, 2007 and ending on the date of 
enactment of this Act by the Board of Governors or a Federal reserve bank 
under the Asset–Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
 
 36. Ivry, Keoun, & Kuntz, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Brady Dennis, Lawmakers agree to expand audit of Federal Reserve, The Washington 
Post (June 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/16/AR20 
10061605541.html. 
 41. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1109, 124 Stat. 1376, 2127 (2010). 
 42. Dennis, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
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Liquidity Facility, the Term Asset–Backed Securities Loan Facility, the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the 
Term Securities Lending Facility, the Term Auction Facility, Maiden Lane, 
Maiden Lane II, Maiden Lane III, the agency Mortgage–Backed Securities 
program, foreign currency liquidity swap lines, and any other program created 
as a result of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (as so designated by this 
title).44 
As a result of the Dodd-Frank audit, the GAO detailed how the Fed 
provided $16 trillion in secret loans to bailout American and foreign banks 
during the financial crisis.45 The GAO also recommended that the Fed 
strengthen policies that deal with conflicts of interest,46 citing, for example: 
Our review of several recommendations for waivers granted from September 
19, 2008, through March 31, 2010, indicated that FRBNY employees who 
requested waivers were generally allowed to continue to retain their related 
personal financial investments. Most of the financial interests were in 
institutions receiving emergency assistance, including AIG, Bank of America, 
Citigroup, General Electric Company (GE), and JPMC. For example, on 
September 19, 2008—3 days after the Federal Reserve Board authorized 
FRBNY to assist AIG—the then-FRBNY President granted, under authority 
delegated by the FRBNY Board of Directors, a waiver to a senior management 
official with financial interests in AIG and GE who was involved in decision 
making related to these two companies.47 
Furthermore, the GAO found that the Fed lacked a comprehensive policy to 
manage risks related to vendor conflicts of interest.48 This was despite the fact 
that the Fed awarded 103 contracts worth $659.4 million to help carry out its 
emergency lending activities, with a few contracts accounting for most of the 
spending.49 The GAO suggested that the Fed could benefit from stronger 
guidance for these contracts.50 Indeed, “the highest-value contracts were 
awarded noncompetitively due to exigent circumstances. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (FRBNY) awarded almost two-thirds of its contracts 
noncompetitively, which accounted for seventy-nine percent of all vendor 
compensation.”51 Additionally, in dealing with risk-management, the Fed 
failed to track potential exposures in adverse economic scenarios and its 
procedures lacked specific guidance on how regional Federal Reserve Banks 
 
 44. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1109. 
 45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-696, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO 
STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 131 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 65. 
 47. Id. at 70. 
 48. Id. at 73. 
 49. Id. at 52. 
 50. GAO-11-696, supra note 45, at 52. 
 51. Id. at 57. 
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should exercise discretion relating to high-risk borrowers.52 Lastly, the GAO 
found that the Fed lacked “guidance and documentation” in its treatment of 
eligible relief program participants.53 
Recent Fed transparency brought about by Bloomberg and Dodd-Frank 
sheds light on the Fed’s conduct in the wake of the 2008 crisis. These limited 
steps can be complemented by political advocacy groups demanding a full 
audit, as discussed in Part V. However, mere data concerning the vast quantity 
of Fed bailouts is not meaningful without the economic framework provided in 
Part III. 
III.  THE FED AND ECONOMIC CRISES: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The model that most clearly explains the role the Fed plays in economic 
crises is Austrian Business Cycle Theory, discussed in Section A below. It 
explains how the central bank, through credit expansion, creates “boom and 
bust” cycles in the economy. Section B will discuss the concept of “moral 
hazard,” a theory which helps explain how the Fed, through its bailouts and 
easy money practices, can encourage risky behavior by economic actors. Two 
final concepts—the redistributionary effects of inflation (Section C) and 
inflationary government financing (Section D)—are relevant to analyzing how 
advocacy groups, such as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, can play a 
role in promoting Fed accountability. 
A. Austrian Business Cycle Theory 
Theories of the business cycle seek to explain why, during the onset of a 
recession or depression, members of the business community suddenly and 
simultaneously experience a massive “cluster” of severe losses,54 or what 
Lionel Robbins called a “cluster of errors.”55 In other words, “[w]hy should the 
leaders of businesses in the various industries producing producers’ goods 
make errors of judgment at the same time and in the same direction?”56 
In his 1912 book, The Theory of Money and Credit,57 Ludwig von Mises 
developed what would later be called Austrian Business Cycle Theory.58 
 
 52. Id. at 82. 
 53. Id. at 117. 
 54. Murray N. Rothbard, Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure (1969), in THE 
AUSTRIAN THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE AND OTHER ESSAYS 65, 72 (Richard M. Ebeling ed., 
1996). 
 55. LIONEL ROBBINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 31 (1971). 
 56. Id. 
 57. LUDWIG VON MISES, A THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT (new ed., H.E. Batson trans., 
1953). 
 58. Roger G. Garrison, Introduction: The Austrian Theory in Perspective, in THE AUSTRIAN 
THEORY OF THE TRADE CYCLE, supra note 54, at 7, 8. The Austrian School of economics refers 
not to the economics of the country of Austria, but derives its name from the nationality of some 
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Mises’s student, F.A. Hayek, won the 1974 Nobel Prize in economics for his 
work expanding on the Misesian theory.59 Under the Austrian theory, a 
business cycle begins when the central bank expands its liabilities through 
credit creation.60 This action increases the cash reserves of commercial banks, 
which expand credit and, thus, increase the nation’s money supply.61 This 
credit expansion, in turn, lowers interest rates below what they would 
otherwise be in a free market.62 This is because, in a free market, interest rates 
are determined by the aggregate of individual time-preferences.63 Because a 
loan is an exchange of a “present good” for a “future good,” and people prefer 
current goods to future goods, the interest rate is the premium commanded on 
the market on “money now” over “money in the future,” varying according to 
the degree of people’s time-preferences.64 People’s time-preferences also play 
another important role in Austrian Business Cycle Theory—determining to 
what extent people will save and invest versus how much they will consume.65 
Lower time-preferences, i.e., people are consuming less and saving and 
investing more, mean lower interest rates.66 This is generally how economic 
growth comes about—falling time-preferences lead to increased saving and 
investment, as well as lower interest rates.67 
The trouble occurs when interest rates fall not because of lower time-
preferences and higher savings, but from the artificial expansion of bank 
credit.68 This is because businesses react as if interest rates had fallen due to 
genuine savings: businesses invest more in capital and producers’ goods.69 
Lengthy and time-consuming projects that, before the fall in interest rates, 
 
of its early and prominent practitioners, such as Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig 
von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, etc. For a history of the Austrian school of economics, see EUGEN 
MARIA SCHULAK & HERBERT UNTERKÖFLER, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS: A 
HISTORY OF ITS IDEAS, AMBASSADORS, & INSTITUTIONS (Arlene Oost-Zinner trans., 2011). 
 59. Murray N. Rothbard, Hayek and the Nobel Prize, THE LIBERTARIAN FORUM, October, 
1974, at 7. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, MONETARY THEORY AND THE TRADE CYCLE (1933); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (1931). 
 60. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 81. One could cite endless sources explaining Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory. Rothbard presents one of the most clear, concise expositions. See also 
MISES, A THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT, supra note 57, at 261–366; LUDWIG VON MISES, 
HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 535–83, 787–94 (The Scholar’s Ed., 1998); 
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND MARKET 989–1023 
(2d ed., Scholar’s Ed., 2009). 
 61. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 81. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 81–82. 
 64. Id. at 82. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 82. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 82–83. 
 69. Id. at 83. 
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previously looked unprofitable, now seem profitable.70 Eventually, this money 
gets paid out in higher rents to land and higher wages to workers in the capital 
goods industries, bidding up labor costs in a manner that, for businesses, seems 
sustainable under the current artificial interest rate.71 However, the problem 
occurs when workers and landlords begin to spend this new money.72 Because 
people’s time-preferences have not actually lowered—i.e., they do not actually 
want to save more—workers consume most of this new income, redirecting 
spending back to consumer goods industries.73 People do not save and invest 
enough to buy the newly-produced capital goods, leading to sudden sharp and 
continuing depression in the producers’ goods industries.74 At this point, it 
becomes evident that businesses, due to the artificially low interest rates, have 
misinvested the limited savings available—overinvesting in capital goods and 
underinvesting in consumer goods.75 In his treatise, Human Action, Mises 
makes a famous analogy to a master-builder to demonstrate the Austrian theory 
of the business cycle: 
The whole entrepreneurial class is, as it were, in the position of a master 
builder whose task it is to erect a building out of a limited supply of building 
materials. If this man overestimates the quantity of the available supply, he 
drafts a plan for the execution of which the means at his disposal are not 
sufficient. He oversizes the groundwork and the foundations and only 
discovers later in the progress of the construction that he lacks the material 
needed for the completion of the structure. It is obvious that our master 
builder’s fault was not overinvestment, but an inappropriate employment of the 
means at his disposal.76 
In short, “[t]he inflationary boom thus leads to distortions of the pricing 
and production system.”77 Because prices in the capital goods industries had 
been bid up too high to be profitable once the consumers reasserted their actual 
time-preferences, these prices need to fall until proper market relations can be 
resumed.78 Thus, according to Austrian Business Cycle Theory, a “depression” 
is a painful but necessary phase by which the market economy liquidates the 
malinvestments of the artificial boom, reestablishing consumer preferences for 
consumption and investment.79 Inflationary booms can last for years until 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 83. 
 72. Id. at 83–84. 
 73. Id. at 84. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. MISES, supra note 60, at 557. 
 77. Rothbard, supra note 54, at 84. 
 78. Id. at 84–85. 
 79. Id. at 85. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
628 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:617 
credit expansion finally stops—due to either bank instability or the prospect of 
publically intolerable price inflation—and the inevitable adjustment occurs.80 
Hence, Austrian Business Cycle Theory explains “[t]he repeated and 
recurrent nature of the cycle, the massive cluster of entrepreneurial error, [and] 
the far greater intensity of the boom and bust in the producers’ goods 
industries.”81 If, then, the business cycle is to be blamed on inflationary bank 
credit expansion by the central bank, the Austrian framework would suggest 
that the central bank stop expanding credit in order to minimize the adjustment 
that must occur.82 This also means that, during the onset of a recession, the 
central bank should not try to “prop up” the current structure of business, i.e., 
bailouts, so as not to impede real recovery.83 Furthermore, even if a central 
bank was able to “re-inflate” into another boom, they would just be setting up 
for a larger bust in the future.84 Therefore, under an Austrian framework, in 
order to foster recovery once a recession hits, the best thing a central bank can 
do is “absolutely nothing.”85 
B. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard exists in “actions of economic agents . . . to the detriment of 
others in situations where [the economic agents] do not bear the full 
consequences . . . of their actions.”86 It creates an incentive for one person to 
use more resources than he otherwise would, believing that someone else will 
pay for it.87 In other words, moral hazard may be said to provide a “temptation 
to steal” or “temptation to act irresponsibly.”88 A moral hazard problem exists 
where one actor has the possibility to use another actor’s resources against his 
will and acts accordingly.89 
Government monetary intervention is moral hazard writ large, setting forth 
the following chain of situations in which moral hazard is present.90 The 
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intervention that provides the basis for this large-scale moral hazard is the 
imposition of legal tender.91 In the United States, this means the Congressional 
imposition of Federal Reserve notes as legal tender. Under this system, paper 
money printed by government or the central bank, known as “fiat” paper 
money, does not compete with other monetary products.92 This system of fiat 
paper money creates moral hazard for the monopolistic producer of money, 
i.e., the Federal Reserve, due to the “possibility to create ex nihilo virtually any 
amount of money and, thus, to buy virtually any amount of good and services 
for sale,” with the only limit being the potential for hyperinflation.93 But more 
importantly, fiat paper money creates moral hazard for the users of money, 
which includes citizens, governments, and, most importantly for the purposes 
of this Comment, banks.94 
[T]hey sooner or later come to realize that the masters of the printing press 
have the power to bail out virtually any bankrupt firm or government. Thus 
they engage in more or less reckless financial planning, expecting that the 
monetary authorities will not allow a great mass of reckless planners to go 
bankrupt. This speculation has been borne out by the last thirty years. Public 
and private debts are at record heights all over the world.95 
Hence, the money producers are encouraged to continue to print, while the 
money users are encouraged to engage in reckless financial planning. 
Monetary theorists, aware of these dangers, have pointed out the necessity of 
avoiding impressions by the central bank that it would bail out the market 
participants.96 
As outlined above, this scenario inevitably leads to financial bubbles as 
more or less every market participant is subject to moral hazard, basing their 
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plans on the availability of more resources than are actually available in the 
economy.97 Thus, “paper money by virtue of its mere existence produces 
massive error on a large scale, until the bubble bursts in a crisis.”98 
However, besides setting forth business cycles and creating moral hazard, 
inflation—or “the process of issuing money beyond any increase in the stock 
of specie”99—creates further concerns that are relevant to analyzing the role 
political groups can play in the “audit the Fed” movement. This is because 
inflation has a regressive redistributionary effect, as explained in Section C, 
and can be used to finance government operations, discussed in Section D. 
C. Redistributionary Effects of Inflation 
When the central bank issues new money, or credit, it has a diffusion 
effect—“the first receivers of the new money gain the most, the next gain 
slightly less, etc., until the midpoint is reached, and then each receiver loses 
more and more as he waits for the new money.”100 This is because, for those 
who first receive the money, prices remain the same while, for later receivers, 
prices have been bid up by the newly created money.101 Thus, credit expansion 
has the redistributionary effect of raising prices as the money supply increases, 
with the inflators, and those selling to them, benefitting at the expense of those 
who later receive the money.102 Writes Rothbard: 
This is the charm of inflation—for the beneficiaries—and the reason why it has 
become so popular, particularly since modern banking processes have 
camouflaged its significance for those losers who are far removed from the 
banking operations. The gains of the inflators are visible and dramatic; the 
losses to the others hidden and unseen, but just as effective for all that.103 
The above process describes the “short-run,” or “one-shot,” gains and losses 
from inflation.104 
Inflation also creates permanent gains and losses.105 Each individual will 
react and alter spending patterns differently in response to his gains and 
losses.106 Furthermore, new money forms “a high ratio to the existing cash 
balances of some and a low ratio to that of others,” resulting in “a variety of 
changes in spending patterns.”107 Thus, prices do not increase uniformly, and 
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the purchasing power of money falls disproportionally.108 Because some prices 
rise more than others, some people permanently gain, while some permanently 
lose.109 Rothbard describes some of the notable “losers” in the inflation 
process: 
Particularly hard hit by an inflation, of course, are the relatively “fixed” 
income groups, who end their losses only after a long period or not at all. 
Pensioners and annuitants who have contracted for a fixed money income are 
examples of permanent as well as short-run losers. Life insurance benefits are 
permanently slashed. Conservative anti-inflationists’ complaints about “the 
widows and orphans” have often been ridiculed, but they are no laughing 
matter nevertheless. For it is precisely the widows and orphans who bear a 
main part of the brunt of inflation. Also suffering losses are creditors who have 
already extended their loans and find it too late to charge a purchasing-power 
premium on their interest rates.110 
With the redistributionary effect of inflation in mind, it becomes significant 
that, according to the Consumer Price Index, the purchasing power of the U.S. 
dollar has decreased by over ninety-five percent since the inception of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913.111 It is in this way that the inflationary policies of a 
central bank can be viewed as levying a regressive “inflation tax” for the 
government, discussed in Section D below. 
D, Inflationary Government Financing 
Mises differentiates “simple” inflation from credit expansion, which, as 
described above, sets forth the business cycle.112 In the former instance, 
“political and institutional convenience” causes a government to borrow from 
the central bank, which provides funds by issuing bank notes or crediting the 
government’s deposit account.113 This transaction amounts to fiat money 
creation, or inflation, as the new money filters into the market through 
government spending.114 For example, the United States used this method to 
fund its involvement in World War II, borrowing money from commercial 
banks.115 Thus, this method of borrowing allows the government to finance 
operations through inflation, rather than taxation. In light of the 
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redistributionary effects of inflation, discussed in Section C above, this method 
of government financing amounts to a regressive “inflation tax.” 
IV.  THE FED AND THE 2008 CRISIS 
A. The Housing Bubble 
The events surrounding the recent “Great Recession” have sparked a 
renewal of interest in Austrian Business Cycle Theory.116 Several high profile 
investment advisers and financial commentators, inspired by the failure of 
mainstream macroeconomists to foresee or explain the subprime mortgage 
crisis and corresponding financial meltdown, have employed the theory in their 
interpretation and analysis.117 Indeed, interest in the theory has been reinforced 
by a number of economists, journalists, and politicians associated with the 
Austrian school who warned of the emerging housing bubble.118 Austrian 
economist, Joseph Salerno, demonstrates how the Great Recession serves as a 
textbook example of Austrian Business Cycle Theory.119 
Reacting to the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and corresponding 
recession in early 2001, the Federal Reserve immediately and aggressively 
lowered the target Federal Funds rate and reversed a decline in monetary 
growth.120 This expansionary monetary policy was further spurred by the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.121 From 2001 to the end of 2005, the 
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Fed’s MZM122 monetary aggregate increased by about $1 billon per week and 
the M2123 aggregate by about $750 million per week, while the monetary base 
increased by about $200 billion, a cumulative increase of 33.3%.124 
The Federal Funds rate was driven down below 2 percent and held there for 
almost three years, pegged at 1 percent for a year . . . . The result was that the 
real interest rate, as measured by the difference between the Federal Funds rate 
and headline CPI, was negative from roughly 2003 to 2005. Rates on 30-year 
conventional mortgages fell sharply from over 7 percent in 2002 to a low of 
5.25 percent in 2003 and, aside from brief upticks in 2003 and again in 2004, 
fluctuated between 5.5 percent and 6.0 percent until late 2005 . . . . Perhaps, 
more significantly, 1-year ARM rates plummeted from a high of 7.17 percent 
in 2000 to a low of 3.74 percent in 2003, rising to 4.1 percent in 2004 and to 
slightly over 5 percent in 2005.125 
Simultaneous with this expansionary monetary policy, credit standards were 
loosened while unconventional (subprime) mortgages became increasingly 
popular.126 The result was a rapid expansion of mortgage lending, with the 
subprime share of home mortgages outstanding rising from 8.62% in 2000 to 
13.51% in 2005.127 Housing prices accelerated to double-digit annual 
increases.128 Writes Salerno: “The housing boom soon turned into a bubble as 
expectations lost contact with fundamentals and propelled housing prices 
upward at accelerating rates.”129 
By 2003, the credit-induced bubble hit corporate profits, and stock prices 
began a steep ascent into 2007.130 This, combined with the aforementioned 
increase in real estate prices, led to a $23 trillion increase in household net 
worth from 2003 to 2006, driving the ratio of household net worth to annual 
GDP to over 450% (an increase of 100 percentage points in a matter of three 
years).131 Salerno describes the effect of the housing bubble on the individual 
household: 
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This enormous increase in net worth was based almost solely on paper profits 
and phantom capital gains on households’ real estate and financial assets. 
Misled by their inflation-bloated balance sheets, households were induced to 
“cash out” some of their home equity and increase expenditures on consumer 
goods and services. In the expression of the day, people began “using their 
homes as ATM machines.” Households financed their increased spending on 
boats, luxury autos, upscale restaurant meals, pricey vacations etc., through 
fixed-dollar debt. The increase in value of home equity and 401(k) plans also 
reduced saving out of current income, and the personal saving rate plunged 
from over 4 percent immediately after the recession of 2001 to less than 1 
percent during 2005 . . . .132 
Thus, from 2003 to 2007, household assets rose by $21,743.3 trillion while 
liabilities, consisting mostly of home mortgages and consumer credit, 
increased by $4,500.8 trillion. As a result, the year-over-year rate of growth of 
household debt nearly doubled, reaching eleven percent for three consecutive 
years.133 
Alas, all artificial credit-induced booms inevitably lead to a bust: in 2007, 
housing prices, corporate profits, and the stock market plunged as “[t]he capital 
gains accumulated since the mid-1990s were revealed to be an illusion.”134 
During 2008, household net worth declined by $13 trillion, or twenty 
percent—a sum that exceeded the annual GDP of Germany, Japan, and the 
U.K. combined.135 “This,” writes Salerno, “brought the overconsumption 
frenzy, which had spanned two inflationary booms, to a screeching halt.”136 
Real retail sales and food services, which had plateaued at an annual rate of 
$180 billion during 2006 and 2007, declined precipitously to $160 billion in 
less than a year and remained stagnant for a year. Concurrently, firms in the 
retail sector shed over 1 million workers from their payrolls with employment 
dropping from a high of 15.56 million in December 2007 to a low of 14.36 
million in December of 2009. On a year-over-year basis, retail employment 
shrank by 5 percent for more than half of 2009. The S&P Retail Stock Index 
(RLX) lost over half of its value between February 2007 and November 2009, 
falling from 533 to 223. Indeed, the fall in the RLX was as sharp and deep as 
the fall of the S&P 500.137 
The Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index, which tracks the total dollar value of 
all U.S. headquartered equity securities, is a good proxy for capital 
accumulation in the United States.138 From 2007 to 2009, the index collapsed 
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from $15.5 trillion to $8 trillion, fluctuating around $12 trillion in 2012.139 The 
index first reached $12 trillion in 1999, implying that there has been no net 
capital accumulation since that time: “The capital that has been accumulated 
since then has either been consumed or wasted in misdirected investments.”140 
But it may happen that even the current level of wealth and income is based on 
false calculations, because the Fed has used every tool at its disposal and has 
even forged new ones in order to prop up housing and financial asset prices. 
The weak and tenuous recovery that the U.S. is now experiencing may well be 
a reflection of the depth of capital consumption and impoverishment that the 
U.S. economy has suffered as a result of the inflation-targeting policy of the 
past two decades.141 
B. Bailouts and Monetary Stimulus 
As discussed above, under the Austrian framework, in order to foster 
recovery once an economic recession hits, the best thing a central bank can do 
is “absolutely nothing.”142 Also as discussed above, even without a full audit, 
one can see this was not the Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crash 
in 2008. In summary, Bloomberg found that the Fed committed $7.77 trillion 
as of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, including $13 billion in 
undisclosed profits to banks.143 The six biggest U.S. banks—JPMorgan, Bank 
of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—
borrowed as much as $460 billion from the Fed and accounted for sixty-three 
percent of the average daily debt to the Fed by all publicly traded “U.S. banks, 
money managers and investment-services firms.”144 Furthermore, a GAO audit 
under the Dodd-Frank Act detailed how the Fed provided $16 trillion in secret 
loans to bailout American and foreign banks during the financial crisis.145 As 
discussed above, these types of bailouts by the Federal Reserve in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis created a classic moral hazard problem: these bailouts made it 
more likely that financial institutions “engage in more or less reckless financial 
planning, expecting that the monetary authorities will not allow a great mass of 
reckless planners to go bankrupt.”146 Furthermore, under the Austrian 
framework, these types of bailouts tend to “prop up” the malinvested business 
structure and impede real recovery.147 
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Fed action in response to the crisis did not stop with immediate bailouts. 
On December 12, 2012, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors announced 
that the Fed, in addition to continuing to purchase “additional agency 
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month,” would be 
purchasing longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per 
month.148 The Federal Reserve has engaged in this type of “quantitative 
easing” policy throughout the Great Recession “[t]o support a stronger 
economic recovery” by “maintain[ing] downward pressure on longer-term 
interest rates, support[ing] mortgage markets, and help[ing] to make broader 
financial conditions more accommodative.”149 Beyond impeding real recovery, 
there is evidence that Fed action is actually re-inflating into another boom: 
according to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, new home sales in November 2012 
increased 15.3% from November 2011.150 And, of course, with any Fed money 
creation comes concern about future price inflation.151 
With the foregoing in mind, the next step of analysis investigates possible 
strategies to bring about Fed accountability and transparency. One such 
strategy could be achieved by employing political advocacy groups, such as 
Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party, whose ideologies are conducive to 
addressing the issue of Fed transparency. 
V.  POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 
A. Occupy Wall Street 
The Occupy Wall Street movement, inspired by the Arab Spring and 
uprisings in Europe, began in September 2011.152 The movement was sparked 
by a call from Adbusters magazine for activists to “bring a tent” to and show 
up at Wall Street.153 On September 17, 2011, a few thousand activists gathered 
in New York City’s financial district, with some setting up camp in Zuccotti 
Park.154 The Occupy protesters took issue with “Wall Street banks, big 
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corporations, and others among the 1%” who were “claiming the world’s 
wealth for themselves at the expense of the 99% and having their way with our 
governments.”155 The movement quickly spread beyond New York as 
protestors gathered in hundreds of cities around the United States and, within 
weeks, over 1500 cities worldwide.156 
While the Occupy movement is not currently aimed at protesting Fed 
policies, many of the concerns of the Occupy protestors have roots in the 
Federal Reserve System. For example, economist and Occupy-champion Paul 
Krugman (although a notorious advocate for expansionary monetary policy by 
the Fed157) suggests that income inequality lies at the heart of America’s 
economic woes.158 Likewise, Professor Raghuram Rajan criticizes the policy 
response to income inequality: 
While many oppose an expansion in government welfare transfers, there are 
few to stand against an expansion of credit to the lower middle class—not the 
politicians, who want more growth and happy constituents; not the banks, 
which benefit from expanded lending; not the borrowers, who can now buy the 
house they had only dreamed of; and not the laissez-faire bank regulators, who 
are reluctant to oppose credit booms because they mistakenly think they can 
pick up the pieces easily if the boom collapses.159 
Rajan writes that credit expansion is a way to expand middle-class 
consumption, causing the masses to “pay less attention to their stagnant 
monthly paychecks.”160 Thus, the policy response to rising inequality in the 
United States in the 1990s and 2000s was to encourage lending to low-income 
households.161 The political benefits of higher consumption were immediate.162 
However, as discussed above, the unsustainable housing boom ended in 
unskilled workers not only losing their jobs, but also in debt from having 
borrowed to buy unaffordable houses.163 Indeed, McLean argues that the 
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financial crisis was not a referendum on home ownership, but rather a 
referendum on “the growing income inequality in America”:164 
[T]he great machinery of the subprime lending market was not built to enable 
people to buy homes. Instead, its main purpose was to allow people to borrow 
against the equity in their homes—the driver of the majority of the risky loans 
that would have brought down the financial sector without a government 
bailout.165 
Rajan suggests that “let them eat credit” is an appropriate way to summarize 
this policy leading up the financial crises.166 
Another issue near and dear to the hearts of the Occupiers is transparency. 
Gillian Tett of the Financial Times167 discusses two key problems with the 
financial system: the “silo problem”—banks reluctant to tell anybody details 
about their activities168—and the issue of “social silences”—finance being too 
“boring,” “unfamiliar,” and “technical” for mainstream public discourse.169 
Tett argues that neither of these problems has been eradicated post-crisis.170 
Thus far, “silo-busting” activity has been “far too modest and sporadic.”171 
Another major goal for the Occupy movement is a more democratic and 
egalitarian economy, or “to roll back the increasing threats to the inclusive 
nature of economic institutions in the United States.”172 Following in the 
footsteps of the Populists and Progressives of American history, Occupy 
protestors attempt to change political institutions “to remove the control that 
the wealthy have over the agendas and policies of the main political parties.”173 
By definition, the Occupy movement carries general anti-Wall Street 
sentiments.174 
 
 164. Bethany McLean, Your House as an ATM: The Myth of Homeownership, in THE 
OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 85, 99. 
 165. Id. at 85–86. 
 166. Raghuram Rajan, Inequality and Intemperate Policy, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra 
note 158, at 79, 81. 
 167. Gillian Tett, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Problem of Silos and Silences in Finance, in 
THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 44. 
 168. Id. at 46–47. 
 169. Id. at 48–49. 
 170. Id. at 50–51. 
 171. Id. at 52. 
 172. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Against Political Capture: Occupiers, 
Muckrakers, Progressives, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 110. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See John Cassidy, What Good Is Wall Street?, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, supra note 
158, at 54, 77 (arguing that Wall street bankers do not create enough economic value to justify the 
rewards they reap); Arjun Appadurai, A Nation of Business Junkies, in THE OCCUPY HANDBOOK, 
supra note 158, at 113, 116 (“The avalanche of business knowledge and information dropping on 
the American middle class . . . has made us business junkies, ready to be lead like sheep to our 
own slaughter by Wall Street, the big banks, and corrupt politicians.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] “AUDIT THE FED” FROM AN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE 639 
A movement with the foregoing concerns—namely, opposition to an 
economy that “redistributes wealth from the poor and middle class to those at 
the top” through, among other things, “bailouts for giant banks and 
corporations”175—should have great interest in the operations of the Federal 
Reserve. As discussed above, inflation has a redistributionary effect in favor of 
the inflators and early receivers of the new money.176 In practice, Bloomberg 
has found that the Fed committed $7.77 trillion as of March 2009 to rescuing 
the financial system—with the six biggest U.S. banks borrowing as much as 
$460 billion.177—while the GAO uncovered $16 trillion in secret loans to 
bailout American and foreign banks during the financial crisis.178 This type of 
money creation represents not only a regressive “inflation tax” on the “99%,” 
but also the political power that the “1%” has in the political system. As 
discussed above, Fed credit expansion policy during the boom was ultimately 
to the detriment of the middle- and lower-class. Certainly, any movement that 
is anti-Wall Street should at least be curious about the Fed. What better way to 
foster transparency in the financial system and “stick it” to the 1% than to audit 
the Fed? 
Thus, Occupy Wall Street should be part of a coalition that pushes for an 
audit of the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed 
operations, the movement should be part of a coalition that provides a political 
check on credit expansion, thus helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the 
U.S. economy. 
B. The Tea Party 
In 2009, the Tea Party movement emerged as a “mad as hell” opposition 
movement in response to a push by President Obama and the Democrats for 
economic and healthcare reform.179 The movement emerged during a time 
when the Bush administration had spent hundreds of billions of dollars bailing 
out Wall Street with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the 
Obama administration had passed an $800 billion economic “stimulus” 
package.180 
The Tea Party complains of “federal government spending, the 
government’s soaring debt, and the increasing size of government”:181 
It complains of high taxes and excessive government spending, and it has 
taken the name the Tea Party, where “Tea” stands for “Taxed Enough 
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Already.” It calls for—no, demands—limited government, debt reduction, no 
higher taxes, and no new spending. It reveres the Constitution, interpreting it 
as limiting the powers of the federal government, and argues that Congress has 
far exceeded its rightful boundaries.182 
The Tea Party has had an impact on both the Democratic and Republican 
parties, particularly in the 2010 midterm elections, helping create a Republican 
majority in the House of Representatives and exerting influence on the 2011 
Republican legislative agenda.183 
The Tea Party movement is composed of various ideological factions, 
including conservatives, the “Religious Right,” and constitutionalists,184 as 
well as big business and libertarians.185 It follows, then, that the movement is 
wrought with internal ideological clashes.186 However, Professor Elizabeth 
Price Foley identifies three core principles shared by various Tea Party factions 
across the country: 
(1) limited government—protecting and defending the idea that the federal 
government possesses only those powers enumerated in the Constitution; (2) 
unapologetic U.S. sovereignty—protecting and defending America’s borders 
and independent position in the world; and (3) constitutional originalism—
interpreting the Constitution in a manner consistent with the meaning ascribed 
by those who wrote and ratified the text.187 
These core principles manifest themselves in current issues that are important 
to the Tea Party, including healthcare reform, fiscal responsibility, 
immigration, internationalism, and the war on terror.188 
At least one of the core concerns that helped spark the Tea Party 
movement is directly related to this “audit the Fed” analysis: “The federal 
government’s shift into bailout mode . . . reflecting the resurgence of 
Keynesian economic philosophy in which a failing economy can best be 
salvaged by a constant infusion of government cash—a counterintuitive, let’s 
spend-our-way-out-of-this-mess mentality.”189As the Fed bails out Wall 
Street190 and continues its quantitative easing programs,191 the movement’s 
anti-bailout, anti-Keynesian mentality fits squarely with legislation to audit the 
Fed, as well as providing a political check on the Fed’s credit expansion 
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policy. Moreover, anti-inflationism has a place in conservative ideology,192 
while libertarian philosophy outright opposes the existence of the government-
chartered central bank.193 Finally, and most directly in line with Tea Party 
principles, the fact that the federal government can borrow from the central 
bank in order to fund its operations194 has direct and obvious implications for 
the Tea Party’s main goal of curtailing “federal government spending, the 
government’s soaring debt, and the increasing size of government.”195 
Thus, the Tea Party should be part of a coalition that pushes for an audit of 
the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed operations, 
the movement should be part of a coalition that provides a political check on 
credit expansion, thus helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the U.S. 
economy. Indeed, we have seen that “pressure from anti-tax Tea Party activists 
and other small government advocates” caused 2012 presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney to at least give lip service to the idea196 and the Republican Party 
to include the measure in its platform.197 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent “Great Recession” provides a 
textbook example of Austrian Business Cycle Theory, with an inflationary 
boom leading to an inevitable bust.198 Furthermore, financial institutions are 
more likely to engage in riskier behavior as a result of Fed bailouts that create 
moral hazard.199 Despite the role the Fed plays in bringing about and 
prolonging economic downturns, under current law, monetary policy decisions, 
agreements with foreign central banks and governments, and Federal Open 
Market Committee transactions are immune from Federal Reserve audits.200 
However, the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party movements provide an 
ideological coalition that can push for an audit of the Federal Reserve. 
Furthermore, after more light is shed on Fed operations, the movements should 
be part of a coalition that provides a political check on credit expansion, thus 
helping to regulate the boom-bust cycles in the U.S. economy. That is not to 
say that either group is likely to embrace—or even understand—Austrian 
Business Cycle Theory. However, the movements’ concerns for other issues, 
from inequality to “big government,” can have the unintended consequence of 
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bringing about financial reform through an “unholy coalition” of unwitting 
Misesians. 
There is precedent for this type of “unholy coalition”: the 2009 version of 
the “audit the Fed” bill was introduced by libertarian Ron Paul in the House201 
and self-described socialist Bernie Sanders in the Senate.202 Still, one might 
object that a full audit and corresponding political check on Fed credit 
expansion are not likely. Indeed, Mises himself wrote: “In the opinion of the 
public, more inflation and more credit expansion are the only remedy against 
the evils which inflation and credit expansion have brought about.”203 
However, the fact remains that, according to Rasmussen, roughly seventy-five 
percent of Americans favor auditing the Federal Reserve.204 As the ideological 
tide of the electorate—as represented by the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street 
movements—moves towards a Fed audit, so too does Congress: “audit the 
Fed” finally passed the House in 2012 after Ron Paul had been introducing the 
bill in Congress for a decade.205 Dr. Paul provides anecdotal evidence of the 
excitement surrounding the push for Fed reform on college campuses: 
I was able to speak to more than 4,000 students. . . . [W]hen I mentioned 
monetary policy, the kids started cheering. Then a small group chanted, “End 
the Fed! End the Fed!” The whole crowd took up the call. Many held up 
burning dollar bills, as if to say to the central bank, you have done enough 
damage to the American people, our future, and to the world: your time is 
up.206 
If an audit of the Federal Reserve can appeal to the ideological tendencies of 
both the left-wing Occupiers and the right-wing Tea Partiers, perhaps this 
modest reform is a more practical alternative than trying to address Judge 
Posner’s prognosis of a failure of an entire economic system. 
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